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Abstract
Background: Empirical evidence demonstrates that the Thai Universal Coverage Scheme (UCS) has improved
equity of health financing and provided a relatively high level of financial risk protection. Several UCS design
features contribute to these outcomes: a tax-financed scheme, a comprehensive benefit package and gradual
extension of coverage to illnesses that can lead to catastrophic household costs, and capacity of the National
Health Security Office (NHSO) to mobilise adequate resources. This study assesses the policy processes related to
making decisions on these features.
Methods: The study employs qualitative methods including reviews of relevant documents, in-depth interviews of
25 key informants, and triangulation amongst information sources.
Results: Continued political and financial commitments to the UCS, despite political rivalry, played a key role. The
Thai Rak Thai (TRT)-led coalition government introduced UCS; staying in power 8 of the 11 years between 2001 and
2011 was long enough to nurture and strengthen the UCS and overcome resistance from various opponents. Prime
Minister Surayud’s government, replacing the ousted TRT government, introduced universal renal replacement
therapy, which deepened financial risk protection.
Commitment to their manifesto and fiscal capacity pushed the TRT to adopt a general tax-financed universal
scheme; collecting premiums from people engaged in the informal sector was neither politically palatable nor
technically feasible. The relatively stable tenure of NHSO Secretary Generals and the chairs of the Financing and the
Benefit Package subcommittees provided a platform for continued deepening of financial risk protection. NHSO
exerted monopsonistic purchasing power to control prices, resulting in greater patient access and better systems
efficiency than might have been the case with a different design.
The approach of proposing an annual per capita budget changed the conventional line-item programme
budgeting system by basing negotiations between the Bureau of Budget, the NHSO and other stakeholders on
evidence of service utilization and unit costs.
Conclusions: Future success of Thai UCS requires coverage of effective interventions that address primary and
secondary prevention of non-communicable diseases and long-term care policies in view of epidemiologic and
demographic transitions. Lessons for other countries include the importance of continued political support,
evidence informed decisions, and a capable purchaser organization.
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Background
In 2001, prior to the achievement of universal coverage
of health care, approximately 30% of the Thai population
were uninsured despite the gradual extension of cover-
age to various population groups [1]. Universal coverage
was achieved in 2002 [2] under the leadership of Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra of the Thai Rak Thai
(TRT) party. Beneficiaries in the Medical Welfare Schemes,
the publicly subsidized voluntary insurance scheme, and
the uninsured 30% of the population, were combined
and covered by a new universal coverage scheme (UCS),
financed through general taxation. The Civil Servant
Medical Benefit scheme (CSMBS) and Social Health In-
surance (SHI) for public and private sector employees
remained as independent schemes. Detailed features of
all the three schemes have been described elsewhere [3].
Evidence on equity and financial risk protection of UCS
As a result of continued assessment [4], evidence shows
increased equity of health financing and improved finan-
cial risk protection with the introduction of universal
coverage [5]. First, there is progressive tax financing for
the UCS as the rich pay a higher proportion of their in-
come in taxes than the poor [6]. Second, there is a pro-
poor use of health services because the easily accessible
district health system is contracted as the provider net-
work [7]. Third, government health spending favoured
the poor prior to universal coverage in 2001 and the
same trend has continued in subsequent years, in par-
ticular at district and provincial hospitals; these pro-
poor subsidies were a result of pro-poor utilization [8].
Fourth, there was improved financial risk protection, as
measured by the very low incidence of catastrophic
health expenditure, which dropped amongst the poorest
quintile from 6.8% in 1996 (prior to universal coverage)
to 2.9% in 2009, and amongst the richest quintile from
6.1% to 4.7% (Figure 1) [9]. There was a statistically sig-
nificant difference between rich and poor in all years, ex-
cept in 2000 (P = 0.667) [9].
Finally, the incidence of medical impoverishment is
low and decreasing, as measured by the additional num-
ber of people falling under the national poverty line be-
cause of health payments; this reduced from 11.9% in
2000 (prior to universal coverage) to 8.6% in 2002 and
4.7% in 2009. The main reasons for continuing out-of
-pocket expenditure are UCS members choosing private
hospital inpatient care [10] not covered by the UCS or
bypassing the referral system and hence bearing the full
cost.
Features contributing to equity and financial risk
protection
Four key system features contribute to the equity out-
come and financial risk protection. First, general tax (ra-
ther than premium contributions by UCS members) was
unanimously chosen as the major source of financing; a
small co-payment of THB 30 (US$ 0.7) per visit or ad-
mission was applied in 2001 but removed in 2007. Sec-
ond, universality was adopted in 2001 instead of a
targeting policy. Targeting proponents recommended in-
creasing coverage to population subgroups, such as ef-
fective coverage of poor households, extension of SHI to
cover spouse and children, voluntary enrolment of more
self-employed SHI members through flat-rate monthly
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Figure 1 Incidence of catastrophic health expenditure prior to universal coverage (1996–2000) and after universal coverage (2002–2009),
national averages. Note: catastrophic health expenditure refers to household spending on health that exceeds 10% of total household
consumption expenditure. Source: Computed by Limwattananon S using the national dataset of household socio-economic surveys conducted
by the National Statistical Office.
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contributions, boosting the publicly subsidized voluntary
insurance scheme for the informal sector, and stimulat-
ing private voluntary health insurance uptake by the
rich. Advocates for universality promoted the constitu-
tional right to healthcare of all citizens, and argued that
it was time that Thailand ended the 27-year struggle
with the targeting approach given that 30% of the popu-
lation was still uninsured by 2001, and that the mechan-
ism to identify the poor was not effective in fully
covering the real poor and preventing the non-poor
from getting a free health card due to nepotism in the
local community. Further, coverage of the voluntary
element of SHI was low, as the premium had to be fully
paid by individual contributions with no subsidy from
employer or government. Third, the option of a basic
minimum package was defeated without much debate in
favour of a comprehensive package. Furthermore, the
National Health Security Office (NHSO) responsible for
the UCS has subsequently taken steps to expand cover-
age to a number of illnesses that can produce cata-
strophic costs for households, boosting financial risk
protection. Fourth, NHSO successfully secured the add-
itional funding needed for the expanded benefit package.
The agenda setting and policy formulation stages of
the universal coverage have been fully investigated [11].
Given the centrality of the four inter-related features
(general tax finance, universality principle, financial risk
protection, and securing adequate funding) to ensuring
an equitable outcome and financial risk protection, this
study seeks to explain how and why these features came
about. How did different actors with varying powers, in-
fluence and positions, within the given context of
decision-making and governance, interplay in shaping
these features?
Methods
In line with the conceptual framework in Figure 2, a pol-
icy analysis tool [12] was applied to assess the policy ac-
tors, networks and communities [13], and the process
and context in relation to decisions on the four inter-
related design features. Methods included document re-
views and in-depth interviews of key informants (KIs)
who were policy actors, including policy elites [14] (the
authoritative decision makers who are either supportive
or non-supportive or who can be positively or negatively
affected by these features), civil society representatives
and academia. Ex-ante, a number of KIs were identified
from those closely involved with these design elements.
The initial interviews were iterative and exploratory;
additional KIs were further identified through a snowball
process until saturation of evidence. Researchers devel-
oped a semi-structured interview guide in line with the
conceptual framework which focused on who, when,
why and how policy actors interacted and negotiated
until the proposed features were adopted. The tool was
finalized after testing with two KIs in the NHSO. To en-
sure consistency, all KIs were interviewed by one co-
author; conversations were tape recorded with consent,
and transcribed in Thai by two co-authors.
The literature review was performed first, though inter-
views with KIs were initiated concurrently. Relevant docu-
ments were retrieved from the NHSO for analysis, in
particular minutes of the monthly meetings of subcommit-
tees on Financing and Benefit Package and of the National
Health Security Board (NHSB) between 2003, when the
NHSO was set up, and 2010. Information from interviews
was triangulated and verified against evidence generated
from reviews of relevant documents such as minutes
of various meetings and/or with other KIs for accuracy
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Simple versus complex 
Distribution of benefit across 
society  
Four inter-related features  
General tax financed scheme 
Universality  
Extension of benefit package/deepening risk 
protection 
NHSO secures funding for UCS  
Contextual environment  
Social and economic 
development  
Economic and financial policy 
Political context  
Pressure for quick decision  
Political moment  
Final decision
on the design   
Policy actors  
Policy makers   
Policy elites  
Politicians  
Technical  
Academics 
Researchers  
Healthcare providers  
Private sector 
MOH/University hospitals 
Public perspectives 
Civil society 
representatives  
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Past experiences  
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Motivations 
Use of evidence in their 
deliberations 
Figure 2 Conceptual framework.
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and consistency. A number of re-interviews of KIs were
conducted for clarification and to probe related issues.
NVIVO was used for analysis, based on the four features
and subthemes that emerged from interviews, namely ac-
tors, their power and motivations, interactions amongst
them, and the contextual environment within which each
feature was discussed, negotiated and adopted.
The study received ethical approval from the WHO and
the National Ethics Committee. Data and tapes are securely
stored and will be destroyed after five years. Fieldwork was
conducted in the second half of 2011. In total, 25 know-
ledgeable individuals were identified and interviewed.
Within these, there were five policy makers, five pro-
gramme implementers, four academics, five researchers,
and six stakeholders (two from CSMBS and SHI, one pri-
vate provider, two public providers, and one civil society
organization). These individuals included both supporters
and non-supporters of the four design features, as judged
based on the positions they adopted in 2001–2002.
Results and discussion
Continued political support: the UCS survives seven
governments in eleven years
Between 2001 and 2011, the UCS thrived despite seven
governments, six elections and one coup d’état, ten
Health Ministers who chaired the NHSB, and six Per-
manent Secretaries who headed the Ministry of Public
Health (MOPH). Figure 3 depicts the major events sur-
rounding the UCS.
There was a high degree of continuity in managing the
UCS. The founding Secretary General (SG), Dr Sanguan
Nittayaramphong, previously a high-level policy maker
in the MOPH, was acting in charge of the UCS from its
inception in April 2001 until the National Health Secur-
ity Act in November 2002. With the creation of the
NHSO, he was then appointed SG and served a full
four-year term (2003–2006) which was renewed in 2007.
His successor, one of his deputies who was involved
from the start, has led NHSO from 2008 to date. Reflec-
tions from most KIs see the “relatively stable” (KI 16,
policy maker) term of the SG in ensuring continuity of
UCS policy development and effective implementation.
Over the last decade, there have been two major rival
political parties, the TRT and the Democrats. Five out of
seven governments were TRT or its incarnation (Palang
Prachachon and Pheu Thai-led coalition governments)
which contributed to UCS continuity. Despite the ri-
valry, the Surayud and Democrat governments also sup-
ported the UCS even before they came into power, as
the scheme had proved financial risk protection to its
members. The coup-appointed Surayud government
(Figure 3), an antagonist to the Thaksin regime, not only
“continued support to the UCS”, but under the leadership
of Minister Mongkol Na Songkhla, “also took a number
of bold steps” (KI 25, policy maker). These steps included
the termination of the THB 30 co-payment in 2006 since
the administrative cost of collecting the co-payment
outweighed the revenue generated, deepening financial
Figure 3 Major events relating to the UCS, 2001–2011.
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risk protection through introduction of universal Renal
Replacement Therapy (RRT) for end-stage kidney pa-
tients in 2007, and Compulsory Licensing to improve ac-
cess to high-cost medicines in 2006 to 2007.
Popular support because of tangible benefits helped
ensure continued political commitment while NHSO’s
significant operational capacity could translate political
statements into tangible results. Moreover, civil society
supported UCS co-payment termination since it brought
it in line with the SHI and CSMBS.
“… Despite the rapid turnover [of governments], UCS
has gained social support, free access to a functional
district health service network not only improved
utilization but also significantly reduced household
out-of-pocket payment, from 33.1% of total health
expenditure in 2001 to 13.9% in 2010 while
government health expenditure increased from 56.3%
to 74.8% of total health expenditure in the same
period*. Realizing the tangible benefits, gradually it is
the people who own the scheme, not the political
party.” (KI 16, 18 policy makers).
*Thai Working Group on National Health Account.
National Health Account 1994–2010. Nonthaburi,
International Health Policy Program.
“… while politicians have set the agenda and direction,
the technical arms of NHSB, such as the Finance and
the Benefit Package subcommittees, have been able to
introduce evidence into design and operation, while
NHSO has had a high operational capacity to
translate policy into effective implementation. This is
possibly based on the low turnover in the intelligence
function of NHSB (the two subcommittees) and the
national health policy and systems research
capacities”. (KI 13, policy maker; KI 15, implementer).
Tax-financed universal scheme: political promise and
financial feasibility
Decisions on universality and a tax-financed UCS were
inter-related and closely linked. KIs confirmed that polit-
ical events contributed in a major way to decisions. During
the election campaign in January 2001, TRT, convinced by
technocrat reformists in the MOPH (including the
founder SG and his team), adopted UCS as one of the top
populist agendas, using “THB 30 for treatment of all dis-
eases” as a campaign slogan, while the Democrats “insisted
on a targeted approach” (KI 24, researcher). Subsequently,
these technocrat reformists also played a critical role in in-
fluencing UCS policies.
In the 2001 election, TRT won half of the parliamentary
seats, Democrats 26%, and other small- to medium-sized
parties each 3% to 8%. Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra
appointed Sudarat Keyuraphan and Surapong Suebwonglee
as Health Minister and Deputy, to lead the UCS. Surapong
and Sanguan, the then NHSO SG, shared a similar rural
district doctor background and were alumni of the same
medical school. Not only close colleagues, they were like-
minded public health professionals, driven by personal
experience of the value of the rural district health system.
TRT was bound to its manifesto, and not only was
collecting a premium from UCS members who were
mostly engaged in the rural informal economy technically
not possible, it was not politically palatable [15]. When
the total estimated resource requirements for universal
coverage, THB 56.5 billion, was matched with the MOPH
pooled budget for health services of THB 26.5 billion, the
Prime Minister had the leadership ability and capacity to
mobilize the shortfall of THB 30 billion from tax funding.
The closed-end provider payment method adopted by
the UCS, namely capitation for outpatient services, and
global budget and Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) for
inpatient services, facilitated the political decision; it
ensured a cap on expenditure.
“… To keep political promises and [fill] a feasible
financial gap of THB 30 billion, it is most feasible to
adopt a tax financed non-contributory universal
programme. Collecting premium from UCS members
was neither technically feasible in the short run nor
politically palatable. A hard budget (where
expenditure does not exceed the budget) as the result
of applying closed-end provider payment such as
capitation and case-based payment strongly supported
the political decision. I think political context and
technical evidence matter.” (KI 18, policy maker).
Reflections from other key informants indicated that
translating political promises into actions was the top
priority; it was considered almost impossible for a con-
tributory scheme, given 75% of the population were in
the informal sector, to reach universal coverage within
the government’s four-year term. The only choice was a
tax-financed scheme, given the capacities to mobilize
additional tax finance and contain costs to ensure fiscal
sustainability.
KIs noted that in 2001 to 2002, there was no signifi-
cant opposition to adopting universality, it was socially
and politically legitimate according to the Constitutional
right to healthcare [16] and “government social responsi-
bilities” (KI 07, human rights activist), nor was there op-
position on general tax finance:
“Opposition to universality and tax finance seemed to
be the minority; there was neither a coalition of
opposition nor effective interface of opponents with
political decisions.” (KI 24, researcher).
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However, there were a few conservatives favouring
targeting:
“I don’t understand why UCS should cover the rich
who should pay for their own health, tax revenue
should be used by the poor; when services are free, the
rich will crowd out services. Targeted approach should
be my principle.” (KI 03, academic).
A few international experts also disagreed with univer-
sality, on the grounds that fiscal space was too small
since the economy had not yet fully recovered from the
1997 Asian economic crisis and it was also feared that
hospitals would go bankrupt. Some experts advised
against closed-end payment, advocating consumer
choice of healthcare providers based on fee for service.
However, capitation contracted model applied by SHI
has contained cost in the long run with a decent quality
of care [17].
“They (hospitals) would be viable when closed-end
provider payment is applied. It was proved in SHI
that capitation worked well since 1991.”
(KI 25, policy maker).
The issue of whether SHI members should continue to
contribute to their own scheme was discussed amongst
civil society. The comprehensive Social Security Scheme
includes cash benefit for sickness and maternity leave,
funeral and invalidity grants, child allowance, unemploy-
ment benefits and pensions. Contribution to health be-
nefit makes up only a small portion. In addition, once
members are not covered by Social Security Scheme due
to unemployment or retirement, they are automatically
entitled to and benefit from the non-contributory UCS.
A social consensus finally emerged that the contributory
SHI scheme should be maintained.
Deepening financial risk protection: path dependence,
civil society and NHSO capacities
All schemes prior to universal coverage had provided a
comprehensive package, covering a wide range of ser-
vices with an exclusion list such as treatment of infertil-
ity and aesthetic treatment or surgery. Path dependence,
as well as pragmatism, meant that “UCS continued the
comprehensive package approach” (KI 15, implementer).
De jure, almost all except a few negative list items are
covered; de facto not all these services could be delivered
due to constraints such as availability of specialists and
medical devices at primary and secondary levels, or lack
of incentives for hospitals to provide covered services
such as cataract surgery. This resulted in either queues
or patients choosing not to use their UCS entitlement
but rather pay for private services. The Benefit Package
sub-committee has recognized and removed bottlenecks
within the existing package while at the same time
responding to requests by Royal Colleges and specialists
to include new expensive interventions into the benefit
package through strict health technology assessment [18].
Reflections from various key informants suggest that
the NHSO had developed purchasing skills, in the con-
text of a single purchaser and competitive multiple
sellers, negotiating for the lowest possible price given as-
sured quality, resulting in cost savings. Cost savings pro-
vided more fiscal space to incorporate additional high
cost but effective services into the benefit package.
Adding new interventions into the UCS benefit package
was guided by evidence of cost effectiveness, equity con-
siderations, and budget impact assessment. For example,
the NHSO outsourced open heart surgery and coronary
artery bypass grafting to private hospitals with spare
capacity [6]; and boosted cataract surgery by unbundling
it from the DRG system and “providing an attractive fee
schedule and incentives to physicians” (KI 10, imple-
menter). It also used its monopsonistic power to obtain
cost savings through central purchasing of quality as-
sured medicines and medical devices, improving tech-
nical efficiency.
“NHSO negotiates price of haemodialysis down from
US$ 67 to US$ 50 per session, with a million sessions
a year, cost saving was as large as US$ 170 million.
Centrally purchased erythropoietin drugs brings price
down from US$ 21 to US$ 8 per vial, resulting in US$
12 million annual cost saving.” (KI 05, implementer;
KI 18, policy maker).
RRT was initially excluded from the UCS benefit pack-
age due to its high cost [19]. However, dialysis was pro-
vided free to CSMBS and SHI members, and had
catastrophic costs for UCS members [20]. The issues
were heavily analysed over several years, including de-
mand estimates [21], cost effectiveness analysis [22], pol-
icy analysis [23] and a public opinion survey [24]. It was
clear that RRT was not cost-effective and the long-term
fiscal impact would be huge [25], especially given in-
creasing prevalence of diabetes and hypertension, two
major causes of kidney failure. However, universal RRT
would protect households from catastrophic expenditure
and promote equity across all schemes using public
resources.
Under the leadership of Minister Mongkol Na Songkhla
and pressure on principles of equity from the patient
group [26], a Cabinet Resolution in 2007 endorsed univer-
sal RRT. No resistance was observed “though the policy
had long-term fiscal implications” (KI 09, policy maker).
The political decision was clearly made to protect house-
holds from catastrophic costs, with a strong sense of “rule
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of rescue” [27], and an ethical concern to ensure equity
across the three health insurance schemes. The provision
of evidence was also important.
Annual budget exercise: evidence based negotiation on a
level field
The UCS budget increased from THB 1,202 per member
in 2002 to THB 2,693 in 2011, more than a two-fold in-
crease (Figure 3), which was driven by increases in the
outpatient and inpatient utilization rates (Figure 4), and
costs of production resulting from 6% to 8% annual sal-
ary adjustments, drugs and medical supplies inflation,
and extension of the benefit package, notably to anti-
retroviral medicines in 2003, and RRT in 2007.
There were significant changes in budgeting for the
health sector after the advent of UCS. Prior to 2001, the
Bureau of Budget held discretionary power in allocating
budgets to the MOPH, as they were negotiated on an in-
dividual programme basis and there were thousands of
programmes and projects per year. Such discretionary
power at times led to accusations of corruption. The new
system was more transparent.
“After the advent of UCS, health service budget
approval is based on per capita basis, estimated from
utilization rates and unit cost. New budgeting system
furnishes an evidence-based level negotiation field and
curtails the discretionary power (of the Bureau of
Budget). For example, a total NHSO budget of THB
117.4 billion in 2010 was the product of THB 2,497 per
capita multiplied by 47 million members in 2010. The
spill-over effect was seen when the Ministry of Education
applied budgeting per pupil.” (KI 24, researcher).
The budget process is not only a “series of serious discus-
sions” (KI 18, policy maker) between the Bureau of Budget
and the Financing subcommittee, it has been made a
“public issue” (KI 18, policy maker) gradually creating
public ownership when the media monitored the budget
discussions, and civil society held the government accoun-
table to use evidence. Utilization rates and unit costs are
undeniable facts. Making the budget a public issue was a
key strategy ensuring sustainable financing of UCS.
Conclusions
Studies such as these explore complex processes that re-
quire careful interpretation. Some of the authors have
been heavily involved in the evolution of universal cover-
age and perhaps because of this it was not easy to iden-
tify and solicit from KIs opposing views to the UCS
design features. This may mean the study had a positive
bias. In order to address this, findings from interviews
were verified and triangulated carefully with written
sources.
Policy processes are likely to be highly context-specific,
but by elaborating the Thai experience in this paper, it is
hoped that other countries can identify useful lessons
from the management of the process. In Thailand, the
political commitment to universal coverage and finan-
cial feasibility triggered the decision of a tax-financed
UCS rather than targeting of subsidies and individual
contributions. The operational capacity of the NHSO,
guided by evidence and pressured by the civil society
concerned about equity and financial protection, con-
tributed to deepening financial risk protection and
benefiting members. Gradually, the UCS has become
owned by its members (75% of the population) and is
less subject to political changes, though continued polit-
ical support is vital. Budget proposals based on evidence
of cost and utilization have furnished a level ground for
negotiation on quantifiable indicators. The new trans-
parent budgeting approach of UCS limits discretionary
power and has replaced supply side-line item budgeting.
Lessons for other countries include the importance of
consistent political support, evidence informed deci-
sions, and a capable purchaser organization.
Public expenditure on health, now at 12.7% of the an-
nual government budget, is of concern, although less
than 4% of GDP is spent on health. Continued research
is needed on long-term financial sustainability, especially
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Figure 4 Service utilization rate 2003–2011. Source: Health and Welfare Survey 2003–2007 and NHSO dataset for 2008–2011.
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6in the context of a rapidly ageing society and techno-
logical progress. However, research should also continue
on the processes of universal coverage development, to
learn how the new institutional arrangements become
embedded in Thai politics and society and how they
evolve in the longer term.
Future success of the Thai UCS will require coverage
of effective interventions, which address primary and
secondary prevention of non-communicable diseases in
view of the rapid epidemiologic transition. These inter-
ventions often lie outside the health territory, such as ef-
fective control of tobacco and alcohol use, and community
based interventions to prevent obesity and support ac-
tive physical activities. In view of the demographic tran-
sition, Thailand needs effective long-term care policies,
as elderly care occupies a large part of acute hospital
services.
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